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odern science, particularly physics, is cur­
rently making claims about the existence of 
all kinds of fascinating entities. These range 
from quarks, superstrings, and gravitinos to 
singularities, warped spacetime, and gravitational waves. 
While these entities inspire awe and amazement, it is possi­
ble that their positing is premature and perhaps entirely 
unfounded. In this essay, I will argue that this is indeed the 
case. Any ontological claims about the aforementioned enti­
ties rest on a form of realism that I believe is unwarranted. 
Rather, anti-realism, particularly scientific phenomenalism 
is the view that seems to be most reasonable. In this essay, I 
will first explain a version of scientific phenomenalism (SP) 
defended by W.T. Stace. After addressing some standard 
objections, I will propose some advantages that SP holds 
over scientific realism, particularly in the realm of physicS. 
Scientific phenomenalism belongs to the larger cate­
gory of anti-realism. Anti-realism denies the main claims of 
realism, namely, that scientific theories have truth values, 
theoretical entities really exist, and the aim of science is to 
give a literally true account of the world.i SF denies these 
claims and holds that science tells us simply how things ap­
pear. All that can be known to exist, at least scientifically, 
are the sensations of the world that we experience and how 
they are ordered. Any claims about the existence of theo­
retical entities (like forces, curved spacetime, elech'ons, po­
tential energy, and electromagnetic fields) that underlie 
these sensations are unfounded. 
SP holds that no amount of sense data can justify be­
lief in something outside of perception. For no matter how 
many observations you have, it is invalid to then logically 
infer the existence of something beyond those observations. 
Stace argues that all causal relationships that are observed 
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are in the world of perception. He writes, 
If you admit that we never observe anything except 
sensed objects and their relations, regularities, and 
sequences, then it is obvious that we are completely 
shut in by our sensations and can never get outside 
them. Not only causal relations, but all other ob­
served relations, upon which any kind of inferences 
might be founded, will lead only to further sensible 
objects and their relations. No inference, therefore, 
can pass from what is sensible to what is not sensi­
ble. ii 
I believe Stace is right insofar as we are unable to infer the 
existence of theoretical entities based on sensible objects 
and relations. I do think that some inference from observ­
abIes to unobservables is appropriate, just not in the prac­
tice of science. 
Put another way, science, by its own standards, in­
volves the study of the observable world. A theory that is 
produced can only mean something scientifically if there is 
some observation that can be done to confirm or falsify the 
theory. And so, if a scientific claim involves the existence of 
an object that by definil:ion cannot be observed, this claim 
ceases to be scientific. This is what happens when theoreti­
cal entities are posited to exist. They themselves can never 
be observed, only their supposed effects. Thus, claims 
about the existence of these entities are not in the realm of 
science. That is not to say that such claims are meaningless. 
Rather, they are metaphysical claims which I believe hap­
pen to have significant problems (I will not go into those 
problems here). But for scientists to make claims about the 
existence of theoretical entities is for scientists to go beyond 
the bounds of their discipline. As Chalmers puts it, 1/ a moti­
vation underlying anti-realism seems to be the desire to re­
strict science to those claims that can be justified by scien­
tific means, and so avoid unjustifiable speculation."iii It 
seems quite inappropriate to posit and defend, in the name 
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of science, the existence of entities that can, in principle, 
never be measured by the very tools of science, or any other 
tools for that matter. 
However, this is not at all to say that theoretical enti­
ties are worthless and completely untrue. They are untrue 
in the sense that they do not correspond to any real, mind­
independent existence in the physical world. However, 
they can be true in the sense that they are able to predict 
certain sensations (both in the future, and past recorded 
ones)}v For forces, curved spacetime, electrons, potential 
energy, and electromagnetic fields have proved to be very 
effective in predicting certain phenomena. Stace writes, 
It is a matter of no importance to the scientific man 
whether the forces exist or not. That may be said to 
be a purely philosophical question. And I think the 
philosopher should pronounce them fictions. But 
that would not make the law useless or untrue. If it 
could still be used to predict phenomena, it would 
be just as true as itwasY 
While exploring this issue it is important to add.ress 
a point more fundamental to the discussion. This is 
whether science explains anything, or if it just describes 
and predicts phenomena. Stace holds that it does the latter, 
and that beliefs in the former are what cause confusions 
over theoretical entities. For if one believes that science ex­
plains things, then it is quite natural to look for underlying 
entities that are "causing" the observed phenomena. I-Iow­
ever, what really seems to be going on is the more detailed 
description of what is happening. For example, a tElble feels 
hard to the touch because of the repulsion of the electron 
shells of the atoms involved, which is attributed tol:he elec­
tromagnetic force, which is ultimately a m,ani£estation of 
the combined electroweak force. While these 
1/explanations" are couched in explanatory language, it is 
clear that they are just further descriptions, at some point, 
leaving the realm of perception and entering the realm of 
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theoretical entities. Niels Bohr wrote, "It is wrong to think 
that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics 
concerns only what we can say about nature."vi 
For example, when the question about why things 
fall was posed, the force of gravity was offered. And when 
this proved inadequate, curved spacetime was offered.vii . 
However, in reality, these forces and spacetime curves are 
simply mathematical tools to predict sensations. As Stace 
points out, "And anyone who takes them for 'existences' 
gets asked awkward questions as to what 'curved space' is 
curved 'in."'viii 
I will now address some standard objections to SP. 
First, it is argued that scientific theories (like quantum me­
chanics) have been so amazingly successful in making pre­
dictions, how could they at least not in some way be true? 
SP acknowledges that theories can be very successful in 
predicting phenomena; that is why theoretical entities are 
not worthless. However, just because a theory makes suc­
cessful predictions, it does 1I.ot follow that it must be true or 
nearly true. On the contrary, the ability of a theory to make 
predictions with related theoretical entities not actually ex­
isting has allowed. the continuation of some past theories 
(an example is Fresnel's theory of light as waves in an elas­
tic ether)ix. Furthermore, because of the metaphysical na­
ture of claims about theoretical entities, it is not necessary 
for the entities to exist for a prediction to be correct. In fact, 
theoretical entities by definition could never be observed, 
only their supposed effects. 
Another objection involves the supposed vindication 
of atomic theory in the early twentieth century. Near the 
end of the nineteenth century, several anti-realists 
(including Duhem, Mach, and Ostwald) would not accept 
the atomic theory as true. The supposed atOIns were not 
real, but rather "useful fictions." However, by 1910, the 
supposed vindication of this theory was thought to have 
put anti-realism to rest.x According to Chalmers, the anti­
realists have a response: 
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They demand that only that part of science that is 
subject to confirmation by observation and experi­
ment should be treated as candidates for truth or 
falsity. Howeverl they can acknowledge that as sci­
ence progresses, and as more probing instruments 
and experimental techniques are devised, the range 
of claims that can be subject to experimental confir­
mation is extended.xi 
Another reply is that, to use the objector's own language, it 
is still not clear that the atom has ever been observed. An 
atom can never be seen. The wavelength of visible light is 
not small enough to resolve the distances at the atomic 
scale. All that is "seen" are pictorial representations of some 
other probing technique. "Experiences" of atoms (or any 
other merely theoretical entities) are ultimately sensations 
which are quite compatible with scientific phenomenalism. 
One may further object that scientific theories imply 
the existence of theoretical entities. However, this cannot be 
so. As Beebee puts it, 
A theory employing theoretical terms is really only 
'about' the observable world: what makes the the­
ory true is the obseruable facts being the way the the­
ory says they are. Theoretical terms are introduced 
into a theory only to make it simpler or more ele­
gant. Their presence does not indicate any ontologi­
cal commitment to unobservable entities 'referred' 
to by the terms, since the terms don't, despite initial 
appearances, refer to such entities. xii 
A good example of this is presented by Stace. He discusses 
the nature of potential energy. Classical physics includes 
the idea of potential energy in order to support the law of 
conservation of energy. In order to preserve conservation of 
energy, sometimes when energy seems to disappear, it 
really is being transferred into potential energy. "Now/', as 
Stace writes, Jlwhat does this blessed world 'potential'­
which is thus brought in to save the situation-mean as ap­
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plied to energy? .. What positive meanin.g has the term? 
Strictly speaking, none whatever. Either the energy exists or 
it does not exist. There is no realm of the 'potential' half­
way between .existence and non-existence."xiii Rather, the 
concept of potential energy is introduced to simplify the 
equations. However, it is a subtle and easy step to Inake the 
claim that this potential energy actually exists: "There will 
always be atemptation to hypostatize the potential energy 
as an 'existence,' and to believe that it is a 'cause' which 
'explains' the phenomena."xiv It is natural for humans to try 
to create a mental picture of a physical process. However, it 
seems that this inclination is naIve, and cannot be the aim 
of scientific theories. Paul Dirac writes, "The main object of 
physical science is not the provision of pictures, but is the 
formulation of laws governing phenomena and the applica­
tion of these laws to the discovery of new phenomena. If a 
picture exists, so much the better; but whether a picture ex­
ists or not is a matter of only secondary importance."xv 
I will now present some of the advantages of adopt­
ing SP as opposed to scientific realism. One favorab1e result 
of scientific phenomenalism. is that it accounts quite nicely 
for the rejection of theoretical entities in the past, but the 
retention of their corresponding observations. It is easy to 
forget that in the past, light <;:orpuscles and the ether were 
believed in strongly, perhaps as strongly as electrons are 
believed in now. However, these entities were rejected be­
cause their corresponding theories were rejected. The ob­
servations, that initially supported and then disproved 
their existences, remained. Chalmers writes, 
Anti-realists can point to the history of science to 
substantiate their claim that the theoretical part of 
science does not qualify as securely established. 
Not only have theories of the past been rejected as 
false, but many of the entities postulated by them 
are no longer believed to exist. .. However, the anti­
realist will insist that, although these theories 
proved to be untrue, there is no denying the posi­
l2 JOHN LEE 
tive role they played in helping to order, and in­
deed to discover, observable phenomena...In the 
light of tlus, it seems plausible to evaluate theories 
solely in terms of their ability to order and predict 
observable phenomena. xvi 
I will now discuss a few cases in which SP presents a. 
great advantage in interpreting some rather paradoxical sci­
entific findings. Usually, it is inevitable that in the first year 
or two of university education, physics students will en­
counter the first of many paradoxes within the realm of 
modern physics. Here, the nature of everyday light comes 
under great scrutiny. Two famous experiments suggest two 
totally opposite natures of light. First, the photoelectric ef­
fect revealed that light seemed to come in tiny bundles, or 
quanta. These quanta were called photons and appeared to 
behave like particles. However, the two-slit diffraction ex­
periment revealed that light had a very wave-like nature. 
For when light was shone through a slide with two narrow 
slits close to each other, the effect on the screen behind was 
that of interference. This could only result from the con­
structive and destructive interference between waves of 
light. However, if individual photons were fired at this 
slide at half hour intervals, the same interference pattern 
would gradually emerge on the screen (one dot at a time). 
Somehow, it seems that each individual photon would con­
spire with all the rest (temporally separated) to interfere 
with one another and make the corresponding interference 
pattern.xvii But that is a nonsensical interpretation. Even 
though each photon acts like a particle, it has a distinct 
wave nature. But it itself is not purely a wave or else it 
would interfere with itself. Thus, light seemed to have both 
wave-like and particle-like properties, depending on which 
nature was being investigated. The problem w'as compli­
cated further when this effect was observed using electrons. 
Not only radiation, but matter, appeared to have a dual na­
ture. This, however, presents a Significant problem. How 
could an electron be both a particle and also a wave spread 
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out over vast amounts of space?xviii Both could not be tl'ue 
at the same time. And so a serious paradox arises. How­
ever, the young physicist encountering this problem for the 
first time simply accepts this paradox and moves on to her 
next class assignment. Later, she will probably take a 
course or two in quantum mechanics and leal'll. about the 
existence of probability waves (or wave functions) which 
represent the electron and predict the results of the two-slit 
diffraction experiment. However, this just substitutes one 
hard to understand concept for an even more difficult one. 
For how could a probability wave ever exist? What is its 
fundamental nature? Is it just a mere mathematical con­
struct? Bruce Gregory writes "The wave function 
[probability wave] that forms the solution to Schroedinger's 
equation does not picture something in nature."xix 
And so, the ontological statuses of light, electrons, 
and probability waves become very troublesome, and can 
exist as a "thorn in one's mind."xx However, I suggest that 
the mental quandary that can occur when b'ying to grasp 
these entities is entirely unnecessary. Its elimination not 
only provides some mental relief, but a deeper understand­
ing of reality. According to scientific phenomenalism, these 
troublesome entities are only troublesome because they are 
complex mathematical entities that are h'Jing to be 
squeezed into an existential box. They do not exist in the 
physical world; they are simply mathematical consb'ucts 
used to describe and predict phenomena that do actually 
exist. Once this is realized, the tension is relieved because 
we no longer have to reconcile there actually existing an 
object that has apparently contradictory properties. Rather, 
we simply acknowledge what does exist and thus what 
should be used in scientific reasoning: the observed phe­
nomena and their mathematical description. Bruce Greg­
ory, on Warner Heisenberg's take on this issue, writes: 
The problem with trying to understand the behav­
ior of electrons arises, Heisenberg said, because we 
persist in thinking of electrons as tiny marbles; we 
14 JOHN 
persist in talking as if there were subatonu,c 
H objects" that physical theories somehow describe. 
But elech'ons are not objects in this sense at all, .. 
Asking what the behavior of electrons is IIreally" 
like arises out of the marble fallacy. Such question­
ing is futile. At best any answer is simply a matter 
of taste. Discussions that do not lead to any new 
predictions have no impact on science; discussions 
that lead to new predictions are challenges to be 
met by experiments in the laboratory.xxi 
Another example might serve to illuminate this 
point further. In the field of particle physics, there exists the 
Standard Model (SM), a theory that has proved spectacular 
in making accurate predictions. However, there was a pos­
sible problem with the SM, one that at first glance could ap­
pear fatal. In order for the theory to work, all particles must 
be massless. This is obviously not the case, but a clever trick 
has been developed to circumvent this problem. This trick 
is the Higgs mechanism. The Higgs mechanism involves a 
field which gives mass to all the particles (that have rnass) 
and as a result produces another particle, the I-:Tiggs boson. 
(Incidentally, this boson has not been"discovered" yet and 
is crucial to the survival of the SM.) This Higgs field. is in­
teresting because it supposedly couples to all massive parti­
cles. I have heard several analogies to try to explain how 
this happens. One explanation is that somehow, wherever a 
massive particle is present, it is present with the Higgs field 
which gives it its mass. Another more crude analogy refers 
to particles, when they move through space, as lTIoving 
through a sort of molasses which is the Higgs field. The 
more they are slowed down by the molasses, the lTIOre mass 
they obtain. While these analogies have SOl1le intuitive ap­
peal, they are really attempting to solve an unnecessary 
problem, namely, the problem of u.nderstanding what this 
Higgs field really is and how it behaves in the physical 
world. It seems to be more accurate to say that we observe 
that particles have mass, and the mathematical expression 
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of this mass is the Higgs mechanism. But we do not have to 
say that the Higgs field really exists. 
One last example from physics. According to Max­
well's equations, electromagnetic (EM) interactions occur 
via electromagnetic waves. These waves were initially 
thought to propagate through an ether. However, this ether 
was found not to exist but the EM waves were still meas­
ured.xxii So, the natural question arises: What do these EM 
waves trav.el in? What do the waves wave in? The answer is 
nothing. It gets even more conceptually difficult when try­
; ing to understand how an EM wave moves. One way to 
think about it would be that at any given location, the elec­
r tric (E)-field and magnetic (B)-field oscillate up and down 
at perpendicular directions as the EM wave passes through. 
But this only passes the problem off to E-fields and B-fields. 
t What are they? WelL they can be measured by placing a 
test charge in the region and seeing how it moves. Now we 
are in the realm of observation. But until we move into this 
realm, the concepts of EM waves, E-fielcls, and B-fields are 
) extremely difficult to grasp. Richard Feynman echoes this 
L. frustration: "I have no picture of the electromagnetic field 
that is in any sense accurate .. .It requires a much higher de­
gree of imagination to understand the electromagnetic field 
than to understand invisible angels ... "xxiii Perhaps these 
11 fields are just useful mathematical tools that help to predict 
a where a test charge will move, or whether you will hear 
j grunge rock or NPR coming from your radio. 
s Not only does scientific phenomenalism provide a 
g more concise and mentally peaceful understanding of the 
e physical world, it also can provide a better context for the­
s ory development. One of the supposed. advantages of Pop­
perian falsification ism is that it encourages the develop­
y ment of bold, risky hypotheses that are easy to falsify. By 
s the invention of bold theories, science can move along be­
cause as each new theory is falsified, something new is 
e learned which can be incorporated into the next theory.xxiv 
n Thus, it is argued that falsificationism provides a cleaner, 
quicker, and more accurate development of science. 
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Whether or not this is the case, I believe that scientific phe­
nomenalism can provide this same benefit. On the other 
hand, I believe that scientific realism can bog down scien­
tific processes with unnecessary metaphysical problems. 
The following is, I think, a good example. In particle phys­
there is a several decade old theory called supersym­
metry (SUSY). According to this theory, every particle cur­
rently known to /Iexist" has a supersymmetric partner, 
which is usually much more massive. SUSY is theoretically 
attractive because it avoids the undesirable problem of 
large canceling infinities in the Standard Model. However, 
one alleged drawback to this theory is that in one simple 
act, the number of elementary particles currently thought to 
exist doubles. Some physicists find this troublesome, not 
only because it provides many more particles that have to 
be looked for and found, but because, to begin with, there 
were already too many elementary particles in the SM. 
However, this kind of theory, whether or not it is success­
ful, is exactly the kind of theory that needs to be presented 
and rigorously explored just because of the fact that it is 
bold, The belief in scientific realism can produ.ce a kind of 
reluctance to seriously explore more unconventional theo­
ries. This is because, according to this view, these more ex­
travagant theories may contain many more theoretical enti­
ties tllat must be discovered and incorporated into an al­
ready burgeoning metaphysical schema, However, the sci­
entific phenomenalist can welcome these theories as bold 
ways to advance the course of science. There is no need to 
try to make metaphysical sense of the new mathematical 
entities. 
In the end, it seems that the more philosophically 
appropriate and practically useful philosophy of science is 
scientific phenomenalism. Not only does it check meta­
physical claims that are cloaked in scientific terms, but it 
provides a more natural way of understanding some sup­
posed paradoxes in physics. Some may say that SP elimi­
nates the awe and wonder that have been inspired by these 
alleged theoretical entities. However, the awe and wonder 
17 DEFENSE OF SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENALISM 
remain; perhaps they have just been misdirected. 
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